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Maurice Merleau- Ponty is often interpreted as claiming that opportunities for action 
are directly present in perceptual experience. However, he does not provide much 
evidence for how or why this would occur, and one can doubt that this is an appro-
priate interpretation of his phenomenological descriptions. In particular, it could be 
argued the Merleau- Pontyian descriptions mistakenly attribute pre- perceptual or post- 
perceptual elements such as allocation of attention or judgment to the perceptual expe-
rience itself. This paper argues for the Merleau- Pontyian idea that opportunities for ac-
tion are present in perceptual experience. It further argues that the phenomenological 
descriptions can be supported and explained via reference to contemporary research 
on motor imagery. In particular, it will be argued that non- conscious, covert motor 
imagery is used to prepare for and regulate skilled actions, and that it is plausible that 
this imagery combines with perception (likely vision) to create a single experience of 
the environment as enabling action. The paper will also show that contemporary views 
on motor imagery are broadly compatible with Merleau- Ponty’s aims.
In various passages in his early works, Maurice Merleau- Ponty suggests that when immersed in skilled action, agents literally perceive the environmental 
scene as presenting opportunities for action. One famous example from The Struc-
ture of Behavior involves a soccer player:
For the player in action the soccer field . . . is pervaded with lines of force 
(the “side lines”; those which demarcate the “penalty area”) and articulat-
ed in sectors (for example, the “openings” between the adversaries) which 
call for a certain mode of action and which initiate and guide the action 
as if the player were unaware of it . . . Each maneuver undertaken by the 
player modifies the character of the field and establishes in it new lines of 
force in which the action in turn unfolds and is accomplished, again alter-
ing the phenomenal field. (1983: 168- 169, translation amended)
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Insofar as they are taken to be alterations of the “phenomenal field,” one might 
understand the putative modifications in the character of the field as being modi-
fications of the phenomenal character of the field as experienced. Thus the soccer 
player would directly experience the “sectors” in perception.1
another characteristic example, this time found in Merleau- Ponty’s Phenom-
enology of Perception, involves an organist:
It is said that an experienced organist is capable of playing an organ with 
which he is unfamiliar . . . He does not learn positions in objective space 
for each stop and each pedal, nor does he entrust such positions to “mem-
ory.” During the rehearsal— just as during the performance— the stops, the 
pedals, and the keyboards are presented to him as powers of such and such 
an emotional or musical value, and their position as those places through 
which this value appears in the world. (2012: 146- 147)
Insofar as the organist has the parts of the organ “presented to him” as capable of 
producing musical and emotional values, the suggestion is that they show up in 
this way in perceptual experience.
To be fair, these passages should allow for multiple interpretations; it is not 
obvious, for instance, that in the soccer example modifications to the “phenom-
enal field” imply modifications to what contemporary philosophers of perception 
call “phenomenal character.” But it is common in the secondary scholarship for 
Merleau- Ponty to be interpreted in the manner suggested above. For example, Hu-
bert Dreyfus finds in Merleau- Ponty the view that a person with expert- level skills 
“not only sees what needs to be achieved” but also “sees how to achieve his goal” 
(2002a: 371- 372). The “sees” here is clearly meant to refer to perceptual experi-
ence; as he puts it, “what one has learned appears in the way the world shows up” 
(2002a: 373). shortly after considering Merleau- Ponty’s soccer example, Koma-
rine Romdenh- Romluc puts the point more directly with another example: “the 
martial artist . . . perceives her situation as requiring a certain sort of behaviour . . . 
her opponent’s fist is seen as an opportunity to duck, an unguarded chest presented 
as an opportunity to deliver a kick, etc.” (2007: 46).2 Here the claim clearly is that 
the martial artist directly sees the opportunities for action.
1. While Merleau- Ponty says that the player is “unaware,” it should be clear that the player 
lacks awareness of the initiation and guidance, which is to say that the player is not aware of con-
sciously choosing a course of action. Merleau- Ponty does not mean to say that the player is visually 
unaware, and this is suggested by the reference to the “phenomenal field.”
2. In a response to Romdenh- Romluc’s paper which is generally critical of her overall argument, 
Dreyfus does approve of this aspect of her interpretation of Merleau- Ponty, and he notes regarding 
the soccer player example that “when the player is totally absorbed in his task . . . he sees the world 
as full of opportunities and threats that ‘pull forth’ appropriate responses from him.” see Dreyfus 
(2007: 60).
 Motor Imagery and Merleau-Pontyian Accounts of Skilled Action • 171
Ergo • vol. 1, no. 7 • 2014
One can certainly question whether it is plausible that such opportunities di-
rectly show up in perceptual experience in the sense that they become contents of 
conscious visual experience (or experience in or across other modalities). Those 
who do not share the putative Merleau- Pontyian view could argue that the rel-
evant elements of the experience should be thought of as pre- perceptual or post- 
perceptual.3 It is easy to think of a basis for the latter type of counter argument; 
for instance, the skilled actors might have the same perceptual experience as those 
who lack the relevant skill, but be better able to make decisions using that percep-
tual information. Instances of the former type might be a bit more difficult to see, 
but consider the possibility that the skilled actors know better where to focus or 
have better attention. There is an obvious sense in which this would lead them to 
have qualitatively different visual experiences from other players; if a great soccer 
player like Cristiano Ronaldo focuses on or attends to something that I do not, he 
will see things that I do not. But the important point here is that the difference lies 
in the focusing and not in the visual contents themselves. If I could attend to and 
see the same things as Ronaldo, we would have the exact same visual contents. 
Thus, for the person who rejects the Merleau- Pontyian view the relevant differ-
ences could boil down to pre- perceptual differences that determine the allocation 
of attention.
Those who want to vindicate the Merleau- Pontyian contention that action op-
portunities are directly presented in perceptual experience often turn to ecological 
perceptual psychology, and in particular to J.J. gibson’s concept of affordance, 
for support.4 In this paper I will take a different direction, however, and argue 
that recent research into motor imagery provides strong support for the Merleau- 
Pontyian phenomenological descriptions.5 specifically, I will argue that motor im-
agery enables the skilled actor to augment the perceptual scene in such a way that 
3. The two species of argument that I am considering here (that the effect is pre- perceptual or 
post- perceptual) are quite common. In particular, they are often made against cognitive penetration 
claims; see Deroy (2012).
4. For example, Dreyfus (2002a) mentions affordances, but he has some reasons for thinking 
that gibson’s view does not perfectly fit Merleau- Ponty’s; see Dreyfus and Kelly (2007: note 3). 
Romdenh- Romluc (2007) does not mention affordances, but she mentions them in other similar 
discussions; see Romdenh- Romluc (2011). For other discussions of Merleau- Ponty and affordances 
see glotzback and Heft (1982) and sanders (1993).
5. It has been argued that motor simulation- - which plays an important role in my consideration 
of motor imagery below- - can play the role of affordances. see, for example garbarini and adenzato 
(2004), who base their conception of simulation on research on canonical neurons. also, gallese 
(2000) connects motor simulation to gibson’s views (without specifically mentioning affordances). 
Both note that their views require some departure from gibson’s work, though, and their reasons 
are somewhat similar to those offered in Dreyfus and Kelly (2007: note 3). gallese also ties his view 
to Merleau- Ponty, though only in cursory fashion. For some arguments against tying affordance to 
motor simulation, see Declerck (2013). I am not taking a hard stance on whether or not the view I 
am espousing in this paper fits with gibson’s work, though I suspect that it does not fit entirely well 
(see footnote 22).
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opportunities for action show up directly, rather than being due to pre- perceptual 
focusing or post- perceptual decision making.
This consideration of motor imagery and the perception of action opportuni-
ties will have two general aims. The first is to show that motor imagery research 
can support the type of phenomenological descriptions offered above and provide 
an empirically plausible explanation of how such phenomena occur. such an ex-
planation is not typically provided by Merleau- Ponty or his interpreters, so this 
paper should add to the literature in that regard. The second aim is to show that 
the motor imagery view that is marshaled to support and explain the phenom-
enological descriptions is compatible with a broadly Merleau- Pontyian view on 
perception and action. a bit of explanation is in order. The aim is not to argue that 
the motor imagery view is in fact Merleau- Ponty’s view (it is not). nor is the aim 
to anachronistically argue that the motor imagery view is one that Merleau- Ponty 
would accept if given the chance. Rather, the aim is to show that the motor imag-
ery view fits in with the kinds of general commitments regarding perception and 
action that Merleau- Ponty establishes in his early works (primarily The Structure 
of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception).
The paper will proceed according to the following plan. section 1 will pro-
vide a general overview of the recent research on motor imagery. section 2 will 
discuss the extent to which the motor imagery research fits with Merleau- Ponty’s 
views. section 3 will then discuss the idea that motor imagery can qualitatively 
affect perceptual experience. This will be key to establishing the idea that op-
portunities for action are directly present in perception. section 4 will then pro-
vide some concluding remarks on the way in which motor imagery can be used 
to vindicate the Merleau- Pontyian phenomenological descriptions. This will in-
volve showing that motor imagery’s effect on perception is not (solely, at least) 
pre- perceptual or post- perceptual.
1. Skillful Action and Motor Imagery
subjects can be said to engage in motor imagery when they imagine that they are 
engaging in a particular action. The term “motor image” does not, however, refer 
to mental imagery that depicts the subject engaging in the action from a third- 
person perspective. nor is motor imagery merely visual mental imagery of actions 
(though visual images are often connected to motor images). as Marc Jeannerod 
puts the point, motor images can be “experienced from within, as the result of the 
‘first person’ process involving mostly a kinesthetic representation of the action” 
(1995: 1419). Jeannerod takes motor images to be a “prototypical form of action 
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representation” insofar as they represent a goal that will be fulfilled if the imagined 
action is completed.6
It is important to emphasize that motor imagery is genuinely imagery in the 
same sense that visual imagery (or imagery in other modalities) is imagery. The 
common view in the contemporary philosophical and scientific literature is that 
mental imagery is, in the words of Thomas (2014), “quasi- perceptual experience; 
it resembles perceptual experience, but occurs in the absence of the appropriate 
external stimuli.” Typically this point is put in representationalist terms; see, for 
example, Kosslyn, Thompson, and ganis’s claim that imagery occurs “when a rep-
resentation of the type created during the initial phases of perception is present 
but the stimulus is not actually being perceived” (2006: 4). One need not describe 
the link between imagery and perception in representationalist terms, however. For 
example, in presenting his enactivist theory Evan Thompson describes mental im-
agery as “a subjectively simulated or emulated perceptual experience” (2007: 297). 
In either case, imagery is taken to occur when processes associated with perception 
take place in the absence of the relevant stimulus.
The most commonly discussed form of mental imagery, visual imagery, thus 
occurs when there is a mental process of the same type as occurs in actual vision, 
but without an external stimulus. But the same thing can clearly happen for other 
sensory modalities. In the case of motor imagery it is kinesthetic or propriocep-
tive processes that are generated. It is further helpful to consider that motor im-
agery can fit the three intuitive features of imagining – directedness, activity, and 
phenomenal character – that amy Kind proposes as a part of her argument that 
imagination involves visual mental imagery (2007: 89- 95). First, motor imagery is 
directed because there is some possible action in the world that the motor image is 
“about.” Motor imagery is also straightforwardly active (one is doing something 
when one imagines), and perhaps more so than visual imagery. according to Jean-
nerod, for instance, “imagined actions are indeed actions in their own right,” large-
ly because our bodies go through many of the same processes (such as increases in 
heart and respiration rate, and activation of motor pathways to relevant muscle 
groups) that they undergo during actual action, though in ways that can end up 
being blocked or inhibited (2006: 39; see also anema and Dijkerman 2013: 100- 
103). He thus thinks of motor images as being simulations of actions that involve 
“dynamic changes in the content of the image over time, corresponding to the un-
folding of the action which is being imagined” (2006: 24). The way in which motor 
images are active also suggests that they have an experiential character; insofar as 
6. The title of Chapter Two of Jeannerod (2006) is “Imagined actions as a Prototypical Form 
of action Representation.”
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there is something it is like to perceive the kinesthetic contents of an actual action, 
there is something it is like to undergo the simulated action.7 Two caveats are in 
order here, however. First, as Kind notes, the experiential character of imagery is 
typically weaker than experiential character of the perceptions the imagery simu-
lates (2007: 94- 95). Frequently, perception and imagery are taken to lie on a sort of 
continuum, with qualities like vividness, determinacy, and intensity weakening as 
one moves from perception to imagery.8 second, and more importantly, it must be 
noted that motor imagery can remain implicit and unconscious. This second point 
will be further discussed below.
Motor imagery can be completely detached from execution of the action, and 
this is perhaps the most common way of thinking of motor images. For instance, 
motor imagery is often used by athletes to practice for competition prior to and 
separate from the actual event. a downhill skier might imagine going through 
the entire race as a part of her race preparation, for instance. such cases are con-
sciously experienced and evince at least some measure of conscious control. Cases 
like this also often combine motor imagery with visual imagery; for instance, the 
kinesthetic sense of the movements involved in skiing would be combined with 
visual images of the course being skied.
For the purposes of this paper, however, it is important to note instances where 
motor images are preparatory for action. Jeannerod argues, for instance, that mo-
tor images are “widely used in preparing actions in everyday life” (2006: 28). as 
noted above, motor images involve simulations of actions, insofar as the same 
bodily processes that are involved in the actual action are also involved in motor 
imagery. In examples like the ski practice case noted above, those processes are in-
hibited, and remain at the level of imagery. But in some cases the processes are not 
inhibited in such a manner, and thus motor imagery amounts to a sort of prelimi-
nary, covert rehearsal of an action that follows. such preparatory motor imagery 
7. Moran, guillot, MacIntyre, and Collet (2011: 233- 234) argue that simulated movements are 
equivalent to real movements at “the neural and/or mental representational levels, not at the phe-
nomenological level”, and furthermore take the view that motor imagery is experienced as being like 
action to involve a category error. Part of their argument for this is that “imagining a boxing match 
or a marathon does not make one feel as tired or as sore as if one actually competed in such events,” 
but all this shows is that the experiences are not identical (and surely no one ever thought that they 
were). Furthermore, Jeannerod (2006)- - to whom Moran et al. (2011: 25- 26) appeal- - uses the first- 
person reports of subjects undergoing motor imagery tasks as a part of his evidence to establish the 
equivalence between motor imagery and actual action in a manner that suggests some phenomenal 
similarity.
8. For more discussion of the relation between perception and imagery see Thomas (2014: 
§1.2), which helpfully summarizes the issue and provides references to further discussion. The view 
that imagery is a weakened perception has a long history (for example, Hobbes (1996: 15- 16) re-
ferred to imagery as “decaying sense” and Hume (2007: 12- 13) took imagery to copy perception 
but with less force and vivacity), and some version of it is implied by the view that imagery occurs 
when sensory processes are engaged absent a stimulus. The specific ways in which different kinds of 
imagery are “weakened” remain to be spelled out, however.
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can be non- conscious, as is suggested by various empirical results. For example, 
in one experiment (Frak, Paulignan, and Jeannerod 2001) subjects were asked 
to quickly judge, via verbal report, whether the task of grasping and emptying 
a container of water would be easy, hard, or impossible. The container was then 
oriented in different ways that would potentially alter the difficulty of the task. 
subjects’ response times varied according to the orientation of the object in a man-
ner that closely corresponds to the time it would take to actually execute the action 
(i.e., it would take longer to respond “difficult” when the object was positioned 
in a manner that would make it harder to grasp). The varying response times are 
taken to show that the subjects are facilitating the judgment by simulating the ac-
tion (with the more difficult action comes a longer simulation). But a crucial point 
here for Jeannerod is that subjects were asked to quickly report the judgment (thus 
reducing the chance that they would have time to consciously consider the matter) 
and were not instructed to consciously imagine the action (2006: 28). Due to this, 
he interprets such experiments as showing that people engage in non- conscious 
preparatory simulations of actions.9
a terminological issue arises here. It is common to take the term “imagery” to 
refer specifically to a class of conscious experiences. For example, Moulton and 
Kosslyn (2009: 1278) generally agree with Jeannerod that imagery can involve 
action simulation, but argue for a separation between simulations that use imag-
ery, which they take to be explicit and conscious, and those that are implicit. In 
fact, Jeannerod himself seems to treat the matter this way in some of his earlier 
works on the subject (e.g., Jeannerod 1994: 190). In later works, however, he self- 
consciously departs from the common understanding of imagery as necessarily 
consciously experienced: “whereas the term ‘motor image’ classically refers to ex-
plicit or conscious representation of an action (imagine yourself running or raising 
your hand), the same concept also includes other, implicit or unconscious, aspects 
of the same phenomenon” (Jeannerod and Frak 1999: 735; see also Jeannerod 
2006: 28).10 The reason for this terminological choice is that non- conscious motor 
simulations are functionally the same as the motor simulation that is consciously 
experienced (see, i.e., Jeannerod and Frak 1999). Whether or not the simulation is 
consciously experienced depends upon conditions including time constraints (sim-
ulations can happen too quickly for conscious experience to arise) and whether or 
not the simulated action is successfully carried out or inhibited (Jeannerod 2006: 
 9. In this discussion Jeannerod references Frak, Paulignan, and Jeannerod (2001) and de’sperati 
and stucchi (1997). In a response to Jeannerod (1994), Rizzolatti (1994: 220) provides different 
support for the idea that there are non- conscious motor images by referencing an experiment that 
measured the neural activity of monkeys who watched experimenters engage in grasping movements.
10. It should be noted that Jeannerod (2006) is not completely unambiguous in this regard. For 
example, on page 28 he refers to “implicit motor imagery” which is non- conscious, but also refers to 
such non- conscious simulations as being “in contradistinction to motor imagery proper.” On balance, 
though, he treats the non- conscious simulations as being a part of motor imagery overall.
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ch. 3). Whether or not such conditions actually come into play, non- conscious 
imagery is in principle potentially consciously experienced; thus the notion of non- 
conscious imagery does not move entirely away from the standard understanding 
of the term imagery. This suggests that the phrase “implicit motor image” is par-
ticularly apt; what is implicit in this case can be made explicit.
To summarize the foregoing points, motor imagery can come into play when 
one readies oneself for action by implicitly simulating the action just prior to its 
performance. But motor imagery does not only prepare the body for action, it also 
helps regulate bodily action during performance by playing a role in the use of for-
ward models or emulators (Jeannerod 2006: 20; see also grush 2004, who favors 
the latter term). Forward models are simulations that enable the body to predict 
outcomes of actions prior to sensory feedback (for an accessible overview see Wol-
pert and Flanagan 2009: 295- 296). Clearly, during bodily action one can adjust 
one’s movements on the basis of sensory feedback (i.e., if an obstacle is in my 
path while I am walking, I can change course). But sensory feedback is slow, and 
alone would not allow for the kinds of quick, fine- grained adjustments made in 
cases of relatively fast skilled action (soccer playing or organ playing, for instance). 
Forward models allow for quicker control by putting forward a pre- action plan 
(motor images can serve as that plan) that can be used to monitor bodily outputs 
(i.e., as we act our actions can be compared to the plan).11 Forward models are 
further linked to the kind of skilled action found in the soccer and organ examples 
because they are enriched through the learning of a skill, which thus enables more 
competent performance (see Wolpert et al. 2011: 739- 742). skilled performers can 
deploy more complex motor imagery that both prepares for and helps regulate 
actual skilled performance (for a similar view see Van Leeuwen 2011).
Insofar as the above description distinguishes between forward models/emula-
tors and the sensory feedback they precede, this way of construing action control 
would seem to separate action from perception. But the opposite is actually the 
case. as grush puts the point, “the perceived environment is the environment as 
made manifest through the organism’s engagements, because the emulator that 
supplies the perceptual interpretation is an emulator of the agent/environment in-
teractions” (2004: 393). Forward models provide predictions that anticipate ac-
tions in a way that runs ahead of slower sensory feedback. This does not mean, 
however, that forward model regulation is separated from sensory feedback. For-
ward models are not only integrated with various sensory feedback loops such 
that their commands can be adjusted, but they also enable filtering of sensory 
11. For more detail on these points, see grush (2006: 378- 380) and Wolpert, Diedrichsen, and 
Flanagan (2011: 740- 742). The way a forward model works is more complicated than I have de-
scribed it here. One important point to note is that the forward model is not necessarily compared 
to our actions directly, but rather to an efference copy, or an internal copy of motor outputs that is 
created as the outputs occur.
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information so those feedback loops can better inform the system (Wolpert et al. 
2011: 740- 742). Thus the perception that results is the product of a thoroughgoing 
combination of sensory information and motor planning.
2. Fitting Motor Imagery into Merleau- Ponty’s Views
given this initial description of the motor imagery view, it is prima facie problem-
atic to say that it can fit with Merleau- Ponty’s views. The first potential problem 
is that it is unclear if Merleau- Ponty would agree with the conception of imag-
ery on which the motor imagery view rests (i.e., that imagery is quasi- perceptual 
and occurs when perceptual processes are engaged absent a stimulus). In his early 
works Merleau- Ponty often seems to stress that perception and imagination are 
discontinuous.12 For example, in Phenomenology of Perception he states that we 
“are never geared into the imagination” as we are in perception (2012: 338), and 
in his 1949- 50 lecture course “structure and Conflicts in Child Consciousness” he 
argues that “the image is not an enfeebled perception. It is not susceptible to being 
“observed” or examined point by point like a perceived thing” (2010: 176). The 
key point in each of these passages is that imagery differs from perception insofar 
as one cannot inspect the image from varying perspectives in the way that one can 
further inspect a perceived object. given this, imagery and perception must differ 
in kind, rather than merely in degree. Following this point, Merleau- Ponty denies 
that the image is a kind of “internal” mental object, which can be inspected inter-
nally in the way that a perceived object can be inspected “externally.”
Merleau- Ponty’s views on imagination are much more amenable to the con-
temporary “quasi- perception” view than these passages suggest, however, and this 
can be seen by examining both the contemporary view and Merleau- Ponty’s view 
further. First, it must be noted that the quasi- perception view of imagery does not 
have to imply that perception and imagery are identical (but for the absence of the 
external stimulus). The quasi- perception view holds that some of the processes that 
perception engages are engaged by imagery, so perception and imagery are func-
tionally similar (not identical).13 and, as was seen above, enactivist views, which 
would reject the idea that mental images are internal objects, still hold to a version 
12. To a large extent Merleau- Ponty is following sartre’s earlier studies on the imagination in 
this regard. On this point see steeves (2001: 370- 372).
13. also, some contemporary imagery research seems to go against Merleau- Ponty’s claim that 
imagery cannot be examined from different perspectives. Most pertinent in this regard is research 
into “mental rotation,” which shows that people can imagine objects that they mentally rotate and 
“view” from different perspectives. One way of interpreting this research is to construe mental rota-
tion in terms of exactly what Merleau- Ponty wants to deny; i.e. one entertains an internal picture that 
one examines from different perspectives. For a concise overview of this research see the supplement 
on “Mental Rotation” to Thomas (2014). But such an interpretation is not obligatory; see Thompson 
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of the quasi- perception view. For Merleau- Ponty’s part, he does say things that 
fit with this view. For example, he says that when one imagines a body part, one 
feels a “quasi- sensation” (2012: 245). Later in Phenomenology of Perception in a 
discussion of thinking through geometrical problems using a triangle, he compares 
using an imaginary triangle to using a “sensible” triangle and notes that the imagi-
nary triangle “is at least virtually situated in my perceptual field” (2012: 405). On 
balance, Merleau- Ponty seems to support something like the enactivist version of 
the quasi- perception view.
a bigger problem for fitting the motor imagery view with Merleau- Ponty’s 
thought is the fact that (as seen in the previous section) motor imagery and for-
ward models/emulators, are often described as being representational.14 Merleau- 
Ponty’s views, on the other hand, are usually taken to be paradigmatically anti- 
representationalist (e.g., Dreyfus 2002a; gallagher 2008b: 360- 364). Of course 
there are large debates over the nature and status of “representations.” and specifi-
cally within the philosophical and scientific discussions that are closest to Merleau- 
Ponty’s concerns (i.e., “embodied cognitive science”) there is a robust debate over 
whether the concept “representation” should be revised and retained or jettisoned 
completely (for a prime example of the “revise and retain” view, see Clark 1998: 
ch. 8; for a prime example of the “jettison” view, see Hutto and Myin 2013). It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to work through these debates and to properly 
situate Merleau- Ponty’s thought within them. But we can fix on Merleau- Ponty’s 
critical points that are most important for the present discussion, and show that 
the conception of motor imagery proposed in the previous section does not have 
to run afoul of these criticisms.
One can find criticisms of representationalist views throughout Merleau- 
Ponty’s early work, but it is important to determine what, exactly, he is criticizing. 
One can start with two basic criticisms. First, he rejects the idea that skilled actors 
consciously engage in mental preparation for their actions. For instance, the soccer 
player is “unaware” of the way in which the skilled actions are initiated and guided 
(for other passages that directly link representation to conscious thought, see, e.g., 
Merleau- Ponty 1983: 63; 2012: 138- 139). Furthermore, in rejecting representa-
tionalist theories of action Merleau- Ponty claims that “consciousness is originally 
not an ‘I think that,’ but rather an ‘I can’” (2012: 139). This amounts to more 
than a rejection of consciousness in action, however. Consider how close Merleau- 
Ponty’s language is to gilbert Ryle’s terminology (“knowing that”/”I think that” 
and “knowing how”/”I can”). Ryle is not just arguing against action requiring 
(2007: 299- 301) for a discussion of mental rotation research in the context of an enactivist theory 
of imagery.
14. as seen in note 6 above, Jeannerod construes motor imagery as being a species of represen-
tation. also, grush presents his theory of emulators precisely as being a (better, he thinks) theory of 
representation; this point is made most directly in grush (1997).
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conscious thought. In The Concept of Mind (2009: ch. 2) he more generally criti-
cizes intellectualist views that take action to depend on propositional states.
Though Merleau- Ponty does not use the language of “propositional states,” 
he would reject propositionalist views of action. a primary reason for this is that 
standard propositionalist views hold that knowing how to act skillfully requires 
knowledge of a fact/true proposition (see stanley 2011: vii). as Jason stanley puts 
the point: “acting with skill is action that manifests an agent’s knowledge of facts” 
about that skillful action (2011: viii).15 For Merleau- Ponty, skilled action would be 
too context dependent and too tied into a holistic network of further actions to be 
adequately specified in terms of discrete facts. This leads him to claim that when it 
comes to action, “I possess the conclusions without the premises being given any-
where” (1983: 30), which is to say that we can complete actions without having to 
somehow possess individual facts or propositions (the “premises”) about how the 
action is completed.16
These two criticisms (against conscious thought and against propositionalism) 
do not apply to the motor imagery view. First, the preparatory motor images that 
are important for the present view are precisely non- conscious and not overtly 
considered or ratiocinated. This point might be obscured somewhat by some of the 
language used. For example, the discussion of forward models/emulators above 
refers to motor imagery as playing a role in action planning. The act of putting 
together a plan for an action sounds like a conscious activity, perhaps of the type 
mentioned above in the downhill skier example. But the action planning connected 
with forward models is not conscious; it is the activity of a sub- personal mental 
process. There is no need to construe the preparations that go into our bodily ac-
tions as conscious or thought out.
But what of the criticism of propositionalist views of action? It should be noted 
that even among representationalist views there is debate concerning whether any 
mental imagery is propositional in nature, with prominent contemporary views 
15. It is worth noting, though, that stanley’s propositionalist view of skilled action does not 
depend on the propositional states being consciously entertained (2011: 19- 21). This possibility is 
connected to the idea that while “knowing that” and “knowing how” are both species of the same 
thing (propositional knowledge) they can differ according to the relevant “ways of thinking.” This 
view, which exploits the Fregean idea that propositions can fit differing “modes of presentation,” 
holds that knowing how exploits “practical ways of thinking” (see 2011: 122- 130).
16. In the broader passage cited here Merleau- Ponty (1983: 29- 30) argues that “intelligence” 
does not intervene in common bodily actions. Part of his reasoning is that intelligent thought would 
take too long, and he is clearly thinking of conscious reasoning here. But he also argues that intel-
ligence would require the action to be divided, untenably, into determined thinkable parts. It should 
be noted that “intelligence” (which he puts in scare quotes in this passage) is equated with intellec-
tion or reasoning, and he does not mean to reduce bodily action to mere reflex. For example, a few 
pages later he refers to “a directed activity between blind mechanism and intelligent behavior which 
is not accounted for by classical mechanism and intellectualism” (1983: 40). This is of course a major 
theme of his early work in general.
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rejecting propositional representation in favor of “depictive representation” (such 
a view is prominently associated with the work of stephen Kosslyn; e.g., Lewis, 
Borst, and Kosslyn 2010). setting this debate aside, it would seem that motor im-
ages would not be propositional in nature because of their distinctly motor char-
acter. Motor images are simulated actions rather than facts about actions. Further-
more, the motor imagery view fits with the Merleau- Pontyian point noted above 
regarding context dependence. Jeannerod, for instance, rejects the idea that motor 
images contain “pre- organized units of action” (2006: 12). This is because motor 
images need to fit changing action contexts and Jeannerod takes them to involve 
“dynamic procedures” (2006: 134). Engaging in motor imagery would thus in-
volve manifesting such dynamic procedures rather than knowledge of facts about 
action. none of these points settle any arguments about the representational status 
of motor images, but it should at least be clear that we need not take arguments 
against propositionalism to be arguments against the motor imagery view.
Beyond the criticisms of conscious representation and propositionalism, 
Merleau- Ponty also rejects the idea that there is some sort of internal objective 
depiction of our actions (the plan) that is separated from the specific contexts 
in which we act. For example, early in The Structure of Behavior he criticizes 
scientific views that conceive of animal behavior in terms of “physiological rep-
resentations” which are, to quote the psychiatrist Paul schilder, “first given as a 
nucleus from which the totality of the movement is subsequently differentiated” 
(Merleau- Ponty 1983: 30; schilder 1923: 65). It is the case that a variety of views 
developed in the 20th Century held, like schilder’s, that actions are represented by 
static formulae, schemas, or models that are stored internally, and which contain, 
in the words of the Russian physiologist nicolas Bernstein, “like an embryo in an 
egg or a track on a gramophone record, the entire scheme of the movement as it is 
expanded in time” (Bernstein 1967; quoted in Jeannerod 2006: 11). For Merleau- 
Ponty such static motor schema are not appropriately context sensitive and require 
an untenable abstraction from the contexts in which actual actions occur (see, e.g., 
2012: 141).17 action cannot be explained in terms of a representation that con-
tains the totality of the action prior to its enactment, because actions only come 
about within specific contexts that cannot be entirely specified beforehand.
The motor imagery view does not fall prey to this criticism either. as we saw 
in the discussion of propositionalism, Jeannerod favors a dynamic conception of 
motor imagery because “the same movement is rarely, if ever, replicated twice . . . 
schemas should be plastic and adaptable rather than fixed” (2006: 12). While 
17. Merleau- Ponty is critical of conceptions of “motor memory” (2012: 141), while memory 
does play an important role in Jeannerod’s theory. But the most important point Merleau- Ponty is 
making is that memory does not provide a complete or static depiction of the movement. Merleau- 
Ponty’s view thus does not depend on removing memory entirely from the process of preparing for 
and regulating our actions.
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preparatory motor images might draw partly on memory, they are primarily “as-
sumed to be embodied in the wiring of the motor system: they are better defined as 
dynamic procedures than as pre- organized structures” (2006: 134). These dynamic 
procedures are made up of “functional rules for assemblage, including the biome-
chanical constraints, the spatial reference frame, the initial positions, the forces to 
apply, etc.” (gallagher 2008a: 179; gallagher is interviewing Jeannerod). so motor 
imagery is derived not from static models but from stored abilities to engage in cer-
tain procedures that are somehow “wired” into the motor system (and, as we will 
see below, this enables them to dynamically engage with the action environment).
In this regard Jeannerod’s view is quite similar to Merleau- Ponty’s description 
in Phenomenology of Perception of the acquisition of motor habits. The organist is 
able to play the new organ without having to draw up a plan because the organist 
has acquired the habit of organ playing. Merleau- Ponty does not have much to say 
about the physiological bases of motor habits. But he does describe habitual ac-
tion as “engaging in the world through stable organs and preestablished circuits,” 
which sounds somewhat like the idea that dynamic procedures are wired into the 
body (2012: 89).18 Our ability to non- consciously simulate an action could be a 
key element of our ability to engage in habitual action.19 Merleau- Ponty is further 
not opposed to the idea that in action we draw on elements that are somehow 
taken on board by our bodies. This is seen in his use of the terms “sediment” and 
“sedimentation.” For example, in The Structure of Behavior he notes that “the 
body in general is an ensemble of paths already traced, of powers already consti-
tuted,” and in a note to this passage connects this to the “‘cultural body’ which is 
the sedimentation of its spontaneous acts” (1983: 210, 249). The “cultural body” 
thus “sediments” these already traced paths, and it is not hard to find in this the 
idea that the processes associated with actions we have previously practiced be-
come embodied in us.20
Importantly, Merleau- Ponty emphasizes that motor habits and sedimentation 
do not tie us to a pre- established outcome. Habits engage our ability to act in new 
situations; Merleau- Ponty says “it is as though our body comprises two distinct 
18. The idea that dynamic procedures of the type Jeannerod discusses are wired into the body 
fits best with the reference to “preestablished circuits.” When Merleau- Ponty refers to “stable or-
gans,” he means elements of our “bodily nature,” i.e. aspects of our given physiology that allow for 
bodily action to occur. Jeannerod of course also includes this aspect in his discussion, i.e. in his con-
sideration of biomechanical constraints (2006: 26- 27).
19. In commenting on grush (2004), schubotz and Yves von Cramon (2004: 414- 415) explic-
itly make such a connection between imagery simulation and habit.
20. although the idea clearly includes the point being made here, it must be noted that there 
is much more to Merleau- Ponty’s discussion of sedimentation than this. In fact, the references to 
sedimentation in Phenomenology of Perception have less to do with bodily actions- - which are pre-
dominantly discussed in terms of habit- - than they do with the embodying of conceptual and cultural 
elements. He also speaks of sedimentation as happening in the world rather than in our bodies, inso-
far as we shape our environments to support our habitual actions.
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layers, that of the habitual body and that of the actual body” and “the habitual 
body can act as a guarantee for the actual body” (2012: 84). In this case the “actual 
body” is the body as it engages in actual action contexts in the here and now. That 
habits enable us to engage in new contexts is partly explained by the point men-
tioned above that they should be thought of as dynamic procedures. One must go 
farther than this, however, and note that the habitual and actual are tied together 
in what Merleau- Ponty calls “the double moment of sedimentation and spontane-
ity” wherein sedimented habits “feed off my present . . . at each moment; they offer 
me a sense, but this is a sense that I reflect back to them” (2012: 132).21
The idea that embodied habits can be tied into present contexts in such a way 
that the present contexts “reflect a sense back into them” fits quite well with the 
way in which motor imagery operates in forward models/emulators. as mentioned, 
above, forward models are linked together with sensory feedback such that the two 
loop together. In emphasizing the importance of seeing motor regulation as based 
on the combination of forward model prediction and sensory feedback, shaun 
gallagher compares this view both to Husserl’s and Merleau- Ponty’s views on the 
temporality of experience (2005: 189- 205).22 There is a protention- retention (to 
use the Husserlian terminology) movement in the activity of the forward model, 
which is to say that the elements of the plan that are moved forward into the ac-
tion prepare for the incoming sensory information that is then retained for use in 
updating the forward model.
The role of motor imagery in forward models also brings up a comparison 
with Merleau- Ponty’s notion of “the function of projection” in action (2012: 114- 
115). In his discussion of the patient schneider, Merleau- Ponty notes (following 
Kurt goldstein) that one of schneider’s problems is that while he can engage in 
“concrete” movements which are tied directly to the given context (i.e., using a 
given hammer to drive a given nail) he cannot easily engage in “abstract” move-
ments which are not tied directly to any given situation (i.e., pretending to hammer 
a nail) (2012: 105- 114). Merleau- Ponty interprets the lack of ability in abstract 
movement to be tied to a general inability on the part of schneider to “invert the 
natural relation between my body and the surroundings” and to thus take one’s 
environment as a situation which allows for the possible actions that one intends, 
21. One should note that in this passage Merleau- Ponty is actually discussing sedimented con-
ceptual knowledge, which is implicitly available for us in our occurrent thinking about the world. 
The general point holds regarding motor habits as well, however.
22. gallagher (2005: 189- 205) also relates the sensory feedback element of action control to J.J. 
gibson’s views, and uses a description of the actions of schizophrenics to show that sensory feedback 
alone, without forward model control, is incapable of regulating normal action. This is perhaps a 
reason to think that gibsonian psychology, and its concept of affordance, cannot adequately explain 
the Merleau- Pontyian phenomenology of skilled action, because it cannot completely explain the 
way in which we anticipate the skilled actions the environment affords.
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rather than being merely guided by that environment (2012: 115). schneider can 
be guided by the world but cannot feed possibilities forward into the world.
Merleau- Ponty uses the metaphor of “projection” to describe our ability to 
find our possibilities for action in the environment; we “project” possibilities upon 
the world.23 It is not difficult to think of the use of motor imagery in forward mod-
els in the terms of such projection. When one engages a preparatory motor image 
that then feeds forward into an emulation that predicts and regulates action, one 
is precisely not merely engaging in concrete action. One is rather engaging with an 
action that one takes to be possible and thus fitting a plan for that action onto the 
action scene. and, of course, the very language of “motor imagery” and its connec-
tion with imagination fits well with Merleau- Ponty’s point here; imagery is capable 
of swinging free of the “ready- made or fixed world” (2012: 115).
Of course the foregoing considerations do not prove that Merleau- Ponty 
would himself accept the motor imagery view. But it has been shown that the 
motor imagery view does not fall prey to some of Merleau- Ponty’s key criticisms 
of representationalism, and that the motor imagery view fits well with some of 
Merleau- Ponty’s main concerns. This should be enough to show that it is plausible 
to fit the motor imagery view with a broadly “Merleau- Pontyian” way of thinking 
about action. It should also be noted that the vexed issue of whether or not motor 
imagery should be described in the language of representation is far from settled, 
but the present investigation should be able to proceed without that question being 
definitively answered.24 The big question for the present investigation is whether it 
is plausible to think that motor imagery can affect perception such that opportuni-
ties for action can show up in perception.
3. Motor Imagery’s Effects on Perceptual Experience
While the previous section establishes that contemporary theories of motor imag-
ery can fit with many of Merleau- Ponty’s overall concerns regarding skilled action, 
the question of whether or not motor imagery can support his phenomenological 
descriptions has not yet been answered. Recall that Merleau- Ponty indicates— and 
scholars like Dreyfus and Romdenh- Romluc further emphasize— that we directly 
23. For a discussion of this issue see Romdenh- Romluc (2007). I would propose that the use 
of motor imagery and forward models could help explain the phenomenon of “reckoning with the 
possible” that Romdenh- Romluc considers there.
24. It is quite likely that the key elements of the motor imagery view can be couched in both 
representationalist and anti- representationalist vocabularies. For example, Chemero (2009: 60- 65, 
180- 181) discusses the extent to which emulators (the existence of which he takes to be empirically 
well- supported) can be described in representationalist and anti- representationalist frameworks.
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perceive opportunities for action. What really needs to be shown here is that such 
phenomenological descriptions are empirically plausible and can potentially be 
explained by the effect that motor imagery has on our perceptual experience.
This point will be argued for in this section in two ways that will correspond to 
the two subsections below. First (in subsection 3.1) it will be argued that we have 
good reason to think that imagery can influence perception to create unified ex-
periences. second (in subsection 3.2) it will be argued that there is good reason to 
think that planning for action can affect perception, which gives us further reason 
to think that motor imagery specifically can affect perception. Put together, these 
two arguments will provide strong support for that thesis.
3.1 Imagery’s Effect on Perceptual Experience
There is abundant reason to think that visual imagery can influence visual percep-
tion. It is possible, for instance, to consciously augment visual experience with 
imaginative contents through the process Robert Briscoe terms “make- perceive”; 
Briscoe gives the examples of standing in an empty room and imaginatively ar-
ranging furniture in it or looking at the night sky while one imaginatively “draws” 
lines to connect the stars in a constellation (2008: 479; 2011: 153- 154; forthcom-
ing). as another example, studies show that subjects can combine visual images 
with occurrently perceived figures in order to determine facts about a combined 
image. The authors of a recent study of this type conclude: “mental images pre-
serve structural information of the pattern they represent, and can be integrated 
with percepts to create a single composite representation” (Lewis, Borst, and Koss-
lyn 2010: 270).
One can also find examples of similar effects in perceptual modalities other 
than vision, and examples where the influence is cross- modal. Briscoe mentions, 
for instance, that rock climbers might augment their visual experience of the climb-
ing surface with motor imagery of possible future hand- or- footholds, or sculptors 
might augment their visual experience of a block of marble with motor imagery 
of possible sculpting actions (forthcoming).25 In each case the purpose would be 
(as in the above furniture arranging case) to evaluate future actions. studies also 
show that stimuli in one modality can elicit experiences in another modality; for 
example, visual perception of silent lip reading can activate neural areas associated 
with hearing in a manner that might connect with the feeling that one is hearing 
something (spence and Deroy 2013: 158). also, in one study subjects presented 
25. These cases might also involve visual imagery; i.e. the climber might imagine seeing a hand 
on a rock or the sculptor might imagine what the marble would look like when sculpted in a par-
ticular way (this seems especially likely in the latter case). But insofar as the climber and sculptor are 
engaged in the activity while doing the imagining they would simulate the actions and thus engage 
in motor imagery as well.
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with an audiovisual recording of the ear of a dummy being stroked by a brush 
reported feeling that their own ears had been tickled (Kitagawa and Igarashi 2005; 
cited by spence and Deroy 2013: 158). spence and Deroy (2013) interpret these 
examples as being instances of cross- modal imagery where perceptual experience 
in one modality causes imagery in another modality.
In each of these examples, genuine perceptual processes (i.e., processes con-
nected to an external stimulus) are combined with perceptual processes in other 
modalities that are not directly connected to an external stimulus (i.e., imagery). 
and in some cases this involves motor imagery. Further consider Briscoe’s rock 
climbing example. The climber has genuine visual perception of the rock to be 
climbed and at the same time engages imagery of the possible ways in which that 
seen rock might be gripped or held; thus visual perception and motor imagery are 
combined. Furthermore, it is easy to think of the motor imagery in this case as be-
ing preparatory; the climber is using imagery to plan for the climbing actions to 
come. Thus this example fits well with much of the discussion of motor imagery 
in sections 1 and 2 above. But there is one massive difference: the subject is aware 
of consciously having combined or hybrid perceptual and imaginative experiences. 
In all of Briscoe’s “make- perceive” examples and in the Lewis, Borst, and Kosslyn 
(2010) example, subjects consciously invoke imagery that is added to perception 
such that the two are clearly kept apart (one would not, for instance, report one-
self as literally “seeing” the imagined furniture in the empty room). The examples 
discussed by spence and Deroy are different in that perceptual experiences induce 
imagery, but they are clear that in these cases “people typically do not mix up their 
experiences . . . with genuine percepts” (2013: 162).
But there is also empirical evidence that shows that imagination and perception 
can combine such that the subject does not distinguish the elements in experience. 
Perhaps the most famous example of this is the so- called “Perky effect” wherein 
visual experiences are mistaken for imagined experiences. In C.W. Perky’s original 
experiment, subjects were told to fixate on a blank screen and imagine objects like 
a banana or leaf. unbeknownst to the subjects, visible corresponding objects were 
then projected on the screen, but the subjects reported having only imagined the 
object (for a discussion see Waller, schweitzer, Brunton, and Knudson 2012). In or-
der to support an argument that imagination and perception can combine to form 
a single experience, Fiona Macpherson reports on another similar study:
segal . . . performed an experiment like Perky’s in which she asked subjects 
to imagine the skyline of new York. an image of a tomato was project-
ed onto the screen. Observers didn’t report the tomato image but several 
reported imagining seeing new York at sunset. Thus, we have examples 
where perceptual elements and imaginative elements combine to produce 
the phenomenal character of what seems to the subject to be one state – be 
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it really a perceptual experience, really an imaginative experience, or some 
amalgam of the two. (2012: 52)
The fact that the subjects reported imagining a red sunset but did not report see-
ing a tomato supports the idea that visual experience can non- consciously have an 
effect on imagination, and that the red visual element combined with the imagined 
element to, as Macpherson argues, create one experiential state.
a bit more needs to be said regarding the idea that “one experiential state” is 
created. Perky’s results are often interpreted as showing that perception and im-
agery can be so similar experientially that they are wholly indistinguishable (i.e., 
imagining a banana can be identical to a veridical perception of a banana). see, 
for example, Kind’s claim that “Perky’s experiment shows that, in some cases at 
least, perceiving feels exactly like imagining” (2001: 94; for criticisms of this type 
of interpretation of Perky’s results see Casey 2000: 147- 151 and Hopkins 2012). 
The Perky effect tends to be interpreted in a different manner in the empirical 
psychological literature, however. as Waller et al. (2012: 293) note, subsequent 
experiments (including segal’s that Macpherson reports) have led Perky’s idea to 
“become identified primarily with the idea that perceptual detection or discrimi-
nation is interfered with by concurrent imagery tasks.” They go on to note that 
a body of research following Perky has considered the ways in which imagery 
might facilitate rather than interfere with perception. Reeves and Craver- Lemley 
(who are prominently associated with the “interference” interpretation) suggest 
that while it seems clear that there is an effect, the exact mechanism of the effect 
is unclear (2012: 6- 7).
given this, we might say that the lesson of Perky’s (and subsequent) experi-
ments is not that imagery and perception can be exactly alike, but that imagery 
can affect perception in ways that subjects do not consciously notice. “single ex-
periential state” would in this case just mean that one does not consciously discern 
the elements that are properly perceptual from the elements that derive from or 
are affected by imagery. For example, some of segal’s results are taken to show 
that the detection threshold for perceptual stimuli was raised by the concurrent 
imagery task (e.g., segal and Fusella 1970: 463- 464; see also Waller et al. 2012: 
293). so, on this interpretation, when the subjects were asked to imagine the new 
York skyline, the operation of that imagery task made it more difficult for them to 
consciously detect the faint tomato image, such that they mistook the redness of 
the tomato for a sunset in their imagery.26 This is, of course, specifically an instance 
of imagery interfering with visual perception. But, as noted above, the current re-
26. segal does not herself provide such an interpretation of the skyline/tomato case. Her de-
scription of that case is very brief, and is talked about in general terms, referring merely to the stimu-
lus having an effect on the image (1972: 206- 207). The interpretation given here is consistent with 
segal’s thoughts on such cases, however.
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search holds that imagery could facilitate perception via “Perky- style” influences 
as well.
In the segal experiment, the single experiential state is taken by the subjects 
to be an instance of imagery; they report imagining the sunset over new York 
and do not recognize the visual contribution of the projected tomato. But we can 
find other instances of imagery affecting perception where the experiential state 
is taken to be visual, with subjects not recognizing the contribution of imagery. 
This is important, because that is the kind of situation that would have to be 
at play in the Merleau- Pontyian cases. For example, Kosslyn and sussman argue 
that imagery can supplement visual recognition tasks in this manner; “when the 
generated image matches the input image, we simply experience seeing the object” 
(1994: 1036). Their argument is based partly on the fact that successful computer 
vision programs have been created that use representations that are functionally 
analogous to stored imagery to supplement shape matching tasks (thus making it 
plausible that such a model could explain human vision). But they also hypothesize 
that such a use of imagery can explain experiments where human subjects engage 
in perceptual shape matching tasks. For example, subjects who were asked to de-
termine whether a partially occluded figure was a square provided correct answers 
much more quickly when the figure matched a previous stimulus. These results fit 
what would be “expected if subjects formed an image of the previous stimulus and 
used it to recognize successive stimuli” (Kosslyn and sussman 1994: 1035- 1036).
It has also been recently argued that certain instances of the “memory color 
effect” (wherein one perceives an object to be its typical memorized color— red 
for a heart figure, for instance— even though it is not actually that color) can be 
explained by hypothesizing that imagery affects visual perception in a manner that 
is unknown to the perceiver.27 Regarding a particular memory color effect case, 
Macpherson argues that subjects matched orange cut outs of characteristically red 
figures to red backgrounds because of the influence of imagery:
[In this case] the first step would be that a subject’s knowledge that the cut-
out was of a shape that is of a characteristically red object would affect the 
subject causing them to imagine a red object, or generate the process that 
would typically produce an imaginative experience of a red object. The sec-
ond step involves the phenomenal character of this imaginative state, or the 
imaginative process that typically would produce it, interacting with the 
phenomenal character of the visual experience of the orange cutout shape, 
or the perceptual process which would typically yield such a visual experi-
ence. The result is an experience as of a reddish- orange colour. (2012: 55)
27. For a recent paper which both provides a good overview of the memory color effect, and 
presents an experiment which purports to display the effect, see Witzel et al. 2011.
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On Macpherson’s explanation the subjects had one single perceptual experience 
that combined the imagined red and occurrently perceived orange without the 
subjects realizing that the two elements combined.
Macpherson interprets the experiment as showing that imagery and perception 
“produce one state with phenomenal character whose nature has contributions 
from both the imaginative and perceptual processes” (2012: 55). Following the 
remarks on the interpretation of the Perky effect above, we can take Macpherson’s 
claim to mean that imagery has an unnoticed, non- conscious effect (via interfer-
ence, facilitation, or something else) on the phenomenal character of the perception 
such that the two cannot be teased apart by the subject in the overall experience. 
Hypothetically, for instance, it could be the case that imagining the typically red 
object interferes with color perception such that what would otherwise be seen as 
orange is seen as orange- red.28 This would not be a case of visual experience that 
“feels exactly like” imagery (or vice versa); it would be an instance where imagery 
processes somehow modulate the character of the visual experience (without the 
subject being cognizant of the imagery effect).
so far, it has been shown that imagery in multiple perceptual modalities can 
affect or combine with occurrent perception. This includes the suggestion that mo-
tor imagery can combine with visual perception as in the rock climber and sculp-
tor cases (albeit in ways that keep the imagery and perception consciously apart). 
Evidence has also been given to show that imagery and perception can combine in 
such a way that they result in a unified experience where one does not distinguish 
the effects of imagery from the visual experience (as Kosslyn and sussman (1994) 
put it, we can “just see the object,” instead of taking there to be a hybrid experi-
ence). But this latter evidence focuses solely on visual imagery and visual experi-
ence.
3.2 Motor Activity’s Effect on Perception
The argument of 3.1 thus does not fully support the current thesis, because it does 
not fully show that motor imagery can affect visual perception in a manner that 
results in a unified experience. This section will show that there is good reason to 
think that action can influence visual perception, and when combined with the 
results of 3.1 this will provide support for the current thesis.
There have been numerous recent studies that purport to show that visual 
perception of an environment can be altered by the manner in which one engages 
in particular actions in that environment. In particular, the perception of spatial 
28. note that this is not a hypothesis presented by the researchers in the case Macpherson 
discusses. They are primarily concerned with demonstrating the memory color effect rather than 
explaining it, and merely state that “little can be said at this time as to the mechanism by which an 
interaction of sensory and associative factors might occur.”(Delk and Fillenbaum 1965: 293)
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properties is said to be affected by encumbrance (seeing a hill as steeper when 
wearing a heavy backpack), use of tools (seeing a distance as shorter when reach-
ing with a stick), or skill set (seeing a goal as bigger when one is a good kicker).29 
such studies would seem to provide direct support for the Merleau- Pontyian 
phenomenological descriptions. Their results, however, are too unreliable to suf-
ficiently support the Merleau- Pontyian view. a common criticism of these studies 
is that the experiments are designed such that the results may be due to various 
beliefs the experimental subjects have about the experiments. There is compelling 
evidence that subjects respond to experimental demand characteristics that implic-
itly convey to them the experimenter’s intended results, and the subjects alter their 
responses accordingly (Durgin, DeWald, Lechich, Li, and Ontiveros 2011; Durgin, 
Klein, spiegel, strawser, and Williams 2012; Firestone and scholl 2014).30 Because 
of these problems, we should look elsewhere for empirical support of the idea that 
motor activity affects perception.
a recent experiment of a different kind presents more reliable evidence that 
planning to engage in an action can affect visual perception. Peter Vishton et al. 
(2007) conducted a relevant study where subjects interacted with a model of the 
Ebbinghaus illusion. In the most common version of the Ebbinghaus illusion, two 
central circles of equal size are placed close to one another, with one surrounded 
by larger circles and the other surrounded by smaller circles. Despite being of 
equal size, the central circle surrounded by smaller circles is usually perceived as 
larger. In the study, the central circles were three- dimensional disks that subjects 
could grasp, while the surrounding circles were two- dimensional images printed 
on a paper on which the central disks were placed. Depending on the experimental 
circumstances, subjects viewed the disks and circles and then indicated which was 
larger by verbal response, grasping the target disk, or tapping the target disk (or 
some combination). Overall the results showed that choices were less influenced 
by the illusion when the response involved an action. The authors summarize the 
results as follows:
29. For an overview of this type of experiment see Kirsch and Kunde (2013). Kirsch and Kunde 
note the standard criticisms of these experiments, but think that taken as a whole they still provide 
evidence that visual perception is affected by other contents.
30. Durgin et al. (2011: 1080) give a good example of the effect of so- called experimental de-
mand characteristics: “when participants were asked why they thought that they had been required 
to wear a heavy backpack while making slope judgments of walkable surfaces, they nearly all as-
sumed that the backpack was intended to affect their estimates, and about half reported complying 
with the demand.” along with providing experiments that show the effect of design characteristics, 
Firestone and scholl argue that the relevant studies run afoul of the so- called “El greco Fallacy”; 
they miss the fact that the perceptual effects ought to be pervasive and thus “must cancel each other 
out when the means of reproduction would be distorted in just the same way as the stimulus being 
reproduced” (2014: 39).
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The experiments presented here provide evidence that action choice chang-
es the nature of visual size perception. For every trial, the initial percep-
tual task of the participants was the same: choose the larger of two disks. 
When the participants indicated their choice with a verbal response, their 
perception was strongly influenced by the Ebbinghaus illusion. When their 
choice was indicated with a grasp or touch response, the magnitude of the 
illusion was significantly reduced. a similar reduction was obtained when 
an upcoming reaching task was described to participants. (Vishton et al. 
2007: 718)
so we have empirical support for the idea that engaging in an action can affect 
visual perception.
Imagery does not play any role in Vishton et al. (2007), either in the arrange-
ment of the experiments or their interpretation (nor does imagery play a role in the 
more questionable studies mentioned above, for that matter). There is an element 
of the study that brings it close to the discussion of motor imagery, however. note 
the last sentence of the above block quote; it tells us that the effect of the Ebbing-
haus illusion was reduced in circumstances where the reaching task was merely 
described to the subjects without them having to carry it out. specifically, the sub-
jects had the reaching task described to them before they gave a verbal response. 
Vishton et al. take this as evidence for the fact that “the studies demonstrate strong 
connections between action planning and perception” (2007: 713), and this point 
is further emphasized by the fact that the title of the paper references planning. 
This clearly suggests a connection with the description of motor imagery in section 
I above, where it was shown that motor imagery plays a particularly important 
role in action/motor planning. given the research into motor imagery and motor 
planning, it is not much of a stretch to suggest that the subjects to whom the reach-
ing task was described engaged in a simulation of the action.31 This further makes 
it plausible to think that motor imagery could have been involved in the effect that 
motor planning had on perception.
The experimental set up in this case suggests a kind of linear relation between 
action and perception, i.e., the subject engages in the grasping action and thus the 
perception of the illusion is changed. It should be noted, however, that in real- 
world circumstances the relation would be dynamic rather than linear. Recall that 
motor imagery- driven forward models are tied together with sensory feedback in a 
kind of loop such that action and perception are always tightly tied together.
It is important to clarify what Vishton et al. adds to the points made above. 
31. Of course the results of section I would suggest that the subjects who actually engage in a 
reaching action use motor imagery simulation as well. My point here is not to suggest otherwise, but 
just to point out that motor imagery might well explain the fact that the mere description of the ac-
tion had a similar effect to the actual action.
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In 3.1 it was shown that motor imagery can combine with visual perception in 
instances where the two are consciously discernible (as in the rock climber and 
sculptor examples) and that visual imagery can combine with visual perception 
in instances where the two are not consciously discernible (as in the shape match-
ing and memory color effect cases). But in the Vishton et al. experiment, motor 
planning is said to affect “the nature of visual size perception” (2007: 718). The 
implication is that it is the visual perception itself that is affected such that one 
would say that (as in the shape matching and memory color effect examples) there 
is a single unified experience. One does not consciously discern the motor planning 
from the visual experience of the central disk in the Ebbinghaus illusion case in the 
same manner as one discerns the grip- planning from the visual experience of the 
rock in the rock- climbing case. This is because the motor planning directly affects 
low- level visual processing (Vishton et al. 2007: 717). Thus, while Vishton et al. do 
not directly present a case of motor imagery combining with visual perception in a 
unified experience, the relation between motor planning and motor imagery places 
their study in the vicinity of such a result. Taken as a whole, the results of 3.1 and 
3.2 make plausible the idea that motor imagery can affect our visual perceptual 
experience in such a way that a unified experience results. and this is exactly what 
is needed to support the Merleau- Pontyian phenomenological descriptions of op-
portunities for action being directly perceived.
4. Motor Imagery in the Merleau- Pontyian Case
In order to both summarize the foregoing material and clarify the claim that motor 
imagery can help vindicate the Merleau- Pontyian phenomenological descriptions, 
the results of sections I- III can be fitted into a description of one of the Merleau- 
Pontyian cases. The following will use the organist case, though the same kind 
of description could be given for the soccer player case (or Romdenh- Romluc’s 
(2007:46) martial artist case, or other cases of skilled action).
The experienced organist has developed the habit of organ playing, which 
means that, in Merleau- Ponty’s terms, her body has sedimented an “ensemble of 
paths already traced” (1983: 210) and thus created in the body “preestablished cir-
cuits” (2012: 89) that can be engaged in new acts of organ playing. This Merleau- 
Pontyian language fits with Jeannerod’s language of motor representations being 
stored as dynamic procedures wired into the motor system. When the organist 
sits down at the new organ, she prepares for the action of playing by implicitly 
engaging motor imagery that draws on these preestablished circuits to simulate the 
action of playing. This simulation both leads to the action of playing, and plays a 
role in the deployment of a forward model that can regulate the organist’s activity.
The organist’s non- conscious motor imagery is a part of a motor intention 
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that is not a static pre- action plan; rather it unfolds dynamically in a manner that 
is “immanent in the movement” (2012: 113). This is because the forward model’s 
predictive emulation, in which the motor imagery plays a role, is “geared into the 
world”; it both anticipates sensory feedback via filtering and responds to that feed-
back through continuous updating.32 Thus by engaging in motor imagery simula-
tion and forward model emulation, the organist “projects” her ability to play upon 
the new organ in a manner that reflects “the double moment of sedimentation and 
spontaneity” (2012: 132). This projection of the organist’s possibilities qualitative-
ly affects her perceptual experience such that the keyboard is presented as a place 
through which musical “value appears in the world” (2012: 147), i.e., it presents 
the opportunity to play music. specifying the exact mechanism through which the 
imagery affects the perceptual experience is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
section III suggests at least three possibilities.
First, it may be the case that some of the qualitative aspects of the kinesthetic 
contents of the motor image combine with the qualitative aspects of the occurrent 
perceptual experience in a manner akin to Macpherson’s hypothesis regarding the 
memory color effect. note that Macpherson’s proposal can accommodate the im-
plicit status of the motor image; she writes that “the sort of imaginative process that 
will typically take place in my two- step mechanism is the non- deliberate, unbidden 
kind . . . typically, one will not even realise that one is undergoing an imaginative 
process or that one’s imagination is influencing one’s experience” (2012: 55). Thus 
as the imaginative kinesthetic content of moving to play the organ combines with 
the visual experience of the organ, the organist (to paraphrase Macpherson) has 
an experience as of an organ- to- be- played. Presumably this “combining” would 
involve the imagery affecting (via interference or facilitation) the perception such 
that they cannot be consciously distinguished.
second, it may be the case that the kinesthetic contents of the motor image 
supplement or “fill in” the visual contents of the organist’s perceptual experience. 
On one hand, this possibility could draw on the examples of cross- modal percep-
tion, if we accept that kinesthetic information as it is conveyed in the motor im-
age can supplement the visual scene. On the other hand, one might draw on the 
example taken from Kosslyn and sussman wherein imagery supplements vision 
in recognition tasks. It may be the case that (to paraphrase Kosslyn and sussman) 
the organist simply experiences seeing the organ as offering to be played when the 
content of the motor image matches up with the visual contents. This does strain 
32. Merleau- Ponty uses the language of “gearing in” (the French verb is engrener) throughout 
Phenomenology of Perception. It is, for example, used in the vicinity of the previously quoted passage 
about motor intentionality (2012: 261). In a translator’s comment Donald Landes (Merleau- Ponty 
2012: 496- 497 n. 47) helpfully notes that although literal gears predetermine the way in which they 
will fit together by the shape of their teeth, Merleau- Ponty’s use implies not that the body and world 
fit together in a predetermined way but rather that it is a dynamic process.
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Kosslyn’s and sussman’s argument a bit, because in their case the matching is di-
rect due to the fact that visual imagery is being matched with visual experience. a 
motor image of playing an organ could not match up with a visual experience of 
an organ in the same way because they come from different perceptual modalities. 
nonetheless, it seems plausible that one could retain a looser yet meaningful sense 
of “match” insofar as the visually perceived object would be seen as the particular 
type of thing that fits with the imagined action.
Third, one might draw on the experiments of Vishton et al. to find the relevant 
mechanism. It is possible that when the organist engages in a motor intention 
via motor imagery, the intention may cause the visual system to “alter the way in 
which it processes information” (Vishton et al. 2007: 713). The kind of effect that 
is referred to here affects low- level visual processing, so the motor image would 
affect corresponding elements such as the perception of shape, size (as in Vishton et 
al.), or distance. Thus if this kind of effect is at play in the organist case, the direct 
perception of action opportunities would presumably amount to subtle differences 
in the perceived distance or size of the relevant parts of the organ. so the organist 
might perceive the stops to be slightly larger, or the keys to be slightly closer, than 
they would appear to someone not engaged in planning to play. This would in 
turn make the playable elements of the organ more visually salient, such that they 
would look more “inviting” for action.
Perhaps one of these possibilities is at play in the organist case. They also do 
not appear to be mutually exclusive, so perhaps several of them are at play. Or 
perhaps there is some other explanation; it is not my purpose here to definitively 
answer the question of what mechanism is at play in the motor imagery- perception 
interaction. all three of the above options help provide responses to the potential 
counter- arguments mentioned in the introduction, however. Recall that one might 
respond to the claim that action opportunities show up directly in perception by 
arguing that the relevant aspect of the skilled action experience is actually pre- or- 
post- perceptual. neither would be the case in any of these instances.
It should be most clear that the effect would not be post- perceptual. Even 
apart from the consideration of motor imagery this response faces problems. The 
idea that skilled action depends on post- perceptual judgment seems phenomeno-
logically implausible because of the speed at which much skilled action occurs. 
It also perhaps unnecessarily intellectualizes action (and both of these points are 
commonly made in Merleau- Pontyian analyses). The discussion of motor imag-
ery backs up these points, especially insofar as the motor image plays a role in 
the forward model prediction. If the forward model is necessary because sensory 
feedback is too slow to completely regulate skilled action, surely post- perceptual 
judgments– which would have to come after that sensory feedback– would not be 
up to the task. and in each of the three possible mechanisms discussed above, mo-
tor imagery has an effect on the initial perceptual experience of the situation.
194 • J.C. Berendzen
Ergo • vol. 1, no. 7 • 2014
But what of the possibility that the effect of motor imagery is pre- perceptual? 
First, it has to be noted that some of the effects of motor imagery, or of habituated 
motor abilities generally, would be relevantly pre- perceptual. as Wolpert, Died-
richsen, and Flanagan put the point, “in real- world tasks it has been shown that 
eye movements can betray the difference between skilled and amateur perform-
ers,” and they use the example of a skilled cricket batsman who is better able than 
the amateur to rapidly move his eyes to where the ball is anticipated to be (2011: 
739). This is, again, pre- perceptual in the sense that the habituated skill is affect-
ing where the batsman looks rather than affecting the actual visual processing or 
visual contents. But such pre- perceptual effects do not exclude the possibility of 
more direct effects on perception, and the two are likely combined in the Merleau- 
Pontyian cases. In each of the three possible mechanisms mentioned above, there is 
such a direct effect. In the Macpherson scenario, the imagery affects the qualitative 
aspects of the visual experience such that the person who engages in the relevant 
imagery sees something different from the person who is looking at the same scene 
but without the imagery. The same would be the case in the perceptual filling- in 
scenario, because the imagery matches up directly with the visual perception so 
as to create one experience. Finally, it is clear that the Vishton et al. scenario is 
not pre- perceptual because the imagery would directly effect low- level perceptual 
processing.
Recent work on motor imagery thus provides us with the tools to both vindi-
cate and (at least partially) explain the Merleau- Pontyian phenomenological de-
scriptions. skilled actors can have qualitatively different perceptual experiences of 
the action scene because of the role that motor imagery plays in preparing for and 
regulating action.
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